# Numerical Methods-Lecture VI: Applying Newton's Method 

Trevor Gallen

Fall, 2015

## Motivation

- We've seen the theory behind Newton's Method
- How can we apply it to Value Function Iteration?
- Solving systems of equations
- Maximization!
- Caveat: we'll linearly interpolate for now.


## Monopolistic Competition-I

We might have a system of equations describing agent behavior. Given elasticity of substitution $\sigma$, Income I, marginal cost of production $\phi$, and fixed cost of entry $\nu$, a monopolistically competitive system's equilibrium is given by:

- Consumption aggregation

$$
\begin{equation*}
C=\left(\int_{0}^{n} c_{i}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d i\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Idiosyncratic demand curves:

$$
\begin{equation*}
c_{i}=\frac{l p_{i}^{-\sigma}}{\int_{0}^{n} p_{i}^{1-\sigma} d i} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Aggregate price:

$$
\begin{equation*}
P=\int_{0}^{n}\left(p_{i}^{1-\sigma} d i\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Profit definition:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{i}=p_{i} c_{i}-\phi c_{i}-\nu \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Zero profit (free entry):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{i}=0 \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Optimal markup:

$$
\begin{equation*}
p_{i}=\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \phi \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Monopolistic Competition-II

- We won't bother simplifying, though we can in this case.
- We want to solve these six equations as a function of $n, p_{i}, P, c_{i}, C, \pi_{i}$, and we'll assume a symmetric equilibrium.
- To solve, we'll:
- Step 1: Write all FOC's as a vectorized function of those six variables
- Step 2: Write the Jacobian of the vector of FOC's as a function of those six variables
- Step 3: Apply Newton's Method until we converge


## Monopolistic Competition-III

For code, see Lecture_6_NewtonsMethod_DixitStiglitz.m

## Alternative Use of Newton's Method: Estimation

- Linear regression of the type:

$$
y_{i}=X_{i} \beta+\epsilon_{i}
$$

is easy. (Where $y$ is an $n \times 1, X_{i}$ is an $n \times j, \beta$ is a $j \times 1$, and $\epsilon_{i}$ is a $n \times 1$ matrix).

- $\beta=\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime} Y$
- What if we had a slightly different problem? (Nonlinear least squares, for instance).
- Newton's method helps us find a minimum.


## Some Data

| City | Crack Index | Crime Index |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Baltimore | 1.184 | 1405 |
| Boston | 3.129 | 835 |
| Dallas | 2.103 | 675 |
| Detroit | 2.057 | 2123 |
| Indianapolis | 0.858 | 1186 |
| Philadelphia | 4.087 | 1160 |

## Some Data

- Given $\beta=\left[\begin{array}{l}0 \\ 0\end{array}\right]$ we can calculate $\epsilon_{i}$ :

$$
\epsilon_{i}=\left[\begin{array}{l}
1.18 \\
3.13 \\
2.10 \\
2.06 \\
0.86 \\
4.09
\end{array}\right]-\left[\begin{array}{cc}
1 & 1405 \\
1 & 835 \\
1 & 675 \\
1 & 2123 \\
1 & 1186 \\
1 & 1160
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{l}
0 \\
0
\end{array}\right]
$$

- We can try to minimize $\sum \epsilon_{i}^{2}$.


## In Matlab

- I assume all the data is already in $Y$ and $X$ as it is listed.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& f=(b e t a) \operatorname{sum}\left((y-X \prime * b e t a) .^{\sim} 2\right) \\
& d 1=[d, 0] \\
& d 2=[0, d] \\
& d 3=[d, d] \\
& f-g r a d=(b e t a)[f([b(1)+d ; b(2)]-f(b)) / d ; \\
& f([b(1) ; b(2)+d]-f(b)) / d] \\
& f \_h e s s=(b)[(f(b+d 1)-2 . * f(b)+f(b-d)) / d, \\
& f(b+d 3)-f(b+d 1-d 2)-f(b-d 1+d 2)+f(b-d 3) ; \\
& f(b+d 3)-f(b+d 1-d 2)-f(b-d 1+d 2)+f(b-d 3) ; \\
& f(b+d 2)-2 * f(b)-f(b-d 2)] / d \sim 2
\end{aligned}
$$

## In Matlab

For code, see Lecture_6_NewtonsMethod_LinReg.m

## Initial Conditions



## Step 1


...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP

...NEXT STEP


## 28TH STEP...



## LAST STEP!



Note: took about 863 steps to get both gradients to $<10^{-10}$.

